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Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
§ 1 The relevance of marine insurance  
 
The development of marine insurance has been imperative for the expansion of long-
distance maritime trade. Without marine insurance, the Dutch Republic would not have 
been able to enlarge its trade networks and in all likelihood would not have prospered as 
it did in the early modern era. The emergence and early development of marine 
insurance in the Netherlands has been fairly well documented. The effects of seasonal 
cycles, political changes, and technological innovations have been studied by a variety of 
scholars, mainly from a legal point of view. However, lately, several prominent scholars 
have emphasised the relevance of institutional structures to long-term economic 
development. There are several ways to analyse institutional emergence, its specific 
characteristics and institutional development. One approach, of which Douglass North is 
a prominent advocate, emphasises that the character and scope of the formal and 
informal constraints, which together make up the institutional framework, affect the 
direction of developments. Divergence in institutional structures may also explain why 
inefficiencies persist.  
 Acting within the constraints of these institutions are the various actors: 
merchants, brokers, underwriters, ship-owners and authorities. How did these actors 
cope with the existing restraints, and how did their behaviour and choices affect the 
institutional structure in return? This study focuses on institutional structures, how they 
have influenced the parties involved and how the latter have in turn altered the 
institutions, both formal and informal. Three case studies form the basis of this 
research. I examine and compare insurance systems in Groningen, Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam between approximately 1600 and 1870.  
 How did the systems vary per region and why did a certain system emerge in one 
area but was unable to gain foothold in other areas? As institutions, in particular the 
informal ones, tend to change slowly and incrementally, the direction of change is all too 
often not discernable on a short-term basis. The nineteenth century offers an extra 
dimension, as during this century a number of major transformations accelerated, 
affecting both institutions and actors. By examining the industry over a long period of 
time, we can enhance our understanding of long term institutional change.  
 
§ 2 Regional divergence  
 
The province of Groningen is well-known for the mutual insurance constructions it 
harboured in the nineteenth century, also known as compacten. What is far less known is 
that, as of the beginning of the seventeenth century, skippers in this part of the Dutch 
Republic initiated and developed intricate systems of financial protection. These ‘boxes’, 
as they were called, were incorporated in the skippers’ guilds and were established in 
the city of Groningen and in the rural peat-producing communities of Wildervank, 
Veendam, Pekel A and Oldambten. They were designed to provide financial support for 
skippers in times of distress caused by illness, death, damage to or loss of a vessel. In 
most cases, skippers would have paid a premium based on the calculated risks 
associated with the voyage in which they were engaged. Exactly how the level of these 
premiums was determined is not known. Skippers who lost their ship would generally  
receive a lump sum of 300 guilders, an amount that remained remarkably stable over a 
period of 150 years. In one exceptional statute, it was decreed that both premium and 
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compensation should be based on the value of the ship. In 1752, the great skippers of 
the city of Groningen established the compact, an innovative financial device by which 
each member paid a set amount to a fellow skipper in the event of loss. Although similar 
constructions were already in use in other guilds and in other regions of the Republic,1 
for example for supporting widows or orphans of Guild brothers or members themselves 
in case they fell ill, these Groningen skipper’s guilds distinguished themselves by having 
different structures. The guilds did not simply copy one another’s construction. They 
evidently preferred to develop their own arrangement and to tailor it to their specific 
needs. Comparison with other regions and other industries suggests that the Groningen  
Guild boxes developed independently and a pattern of incremental institutional change 
is discernible. The earliest founding statutes were short, simple and lacking in sanctions. 
Over time, these were supplanted by lengthy, complex documents teeming with penalty 
clauses to deal with the less than honourable practices of some members. The boxes 
had, in all likelihood, been confronted with the consequences of moral hazard, i.e. the 
fact that individuals who are protected against a certain risk behave differently in a 
situation than if they had not had that protection.  
 
The specific character of Groningen’s trade, together with the scale and organisational  
structure of its shipping interests, underpinned the emergence and development of this 
alternative insurance system. A tentative example, comparing premiums from Groningen 
and Amsterdam, shows that the boxes operated reasonably competitively compared to 
the ‘traditional’ insurance market of Amsterdam, largely because they had low operating 
costs and were not aimed at making commercial profits. Their customers were in effect 
also part of the supply side, which kept premiums competitive.  
 Having examined Groningen, the analysis then concentrates on insurance 
activities in the city of Amsterdam. Compared to Groningen, with its system based on 
solidarity, the city along the IJ represented another extreme. Amsterdam, which was the 
dominant insurance market in Europe during the largest part of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, has been characterised as a market of individuals.2 In this 
fragmented market, merchants and underwriters acted primarily alone. Only under 
special circumstances did they collude, and these collusions were often ineffective. 
Although brokers were formally organised into a Guild, this coalition was hardly effective 
and brokers, too, operated on an individual, more than on a collaborative, basis. 
Individualism was the significant characteristic of the Amsterdam insurance market in 
the early modern era. Apart from those seeking insurance protection, those offering to  
write lines and those facilitating the transactions, there were also authorities within the 
industry, of which the Chamber of Insurance and Average was the most relevant. In 
1598, the first insurance ordinance was issued; at the same time, the Chamber of 
Insurance and Average (KvAA) was established. The Chamber played an important role 
by settling disagreements and disputes which are innate to doing business. In the case 
of the insurance business, the issues were too complex and intricate to be dealt with by 
regular courts. In general, the KvAA was to make sure that parties honoured their 
contractual obligations. The commissioners of the Chamber were often merchants, 
frequently related to underwriters or at times even underwriters themselves. My research 
shows that the commissioners were primarily chosen for their expertise, experience, and 
judgment, rather than their political allegiance, although most – if not all – were 
connected to the city’s regents. Prominent names such as Trip, Six, and Van Loon appear 
several times on the list of those who acted as commissioner, also known as 
Assurantiemeesters. 
 From the time of the Chamber’s initiation, its commissioners influenced the 
development of the industry and the conduct of the other parties involved. Several times, 
                                                 
1 See Bos, Uyt liefde tot malcander.  
2 Spooner, Risks at sea, 254. 
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ordinances were altered and new regulations were issued at the Chamber’s instigation. It 
has been suggested that, based upon the number of cases dealt with by the Chamber, 
the insurance market expanded significantly during the second half of the eighteenth 
century.3 However, data does not support this notion, which is based upon the number 
of average cases rather than insurance cases handled by the Chamber. The records of 
the Chamber do suggest that in times of increased danger, most notably when war 
changed the patterns of risk, more appeals were made to the Chamber. This is an 
indication that  
the expertise of the Chamber’s commissioners was valued and their authority 
acknowledged. Acknowledgement of the Chamber’s position is relevant since as a result 
of its role in contractual enforcement it would have reduced uncertainties about the 
validity of insurance contracts and would thus have had a positive influence on the 
market.  
 The brokers were a group directly affected by the Chamber’s aim to influence  
the insurance market. The municipal authorities of Amsterdam had long treated the 
profession of broking with suspicion and considered brokers to be a necessary evil. It 
took a relatively long time for the city council of Amsterdam to finally acknowledge the 
importance of brokers for the expansion of the city’s commercial position in 
international trade. But even after brokers had been officially accepted, distrust and 
contempt prevailed for a long time. Initially, brokers did not specialise exclusively in 
insurances. Of all commercial parties to the insurance industry, the brokers were the 
only group formally organised into a Guild. The Brokers’ Guild was in all likelihood 
established in the third quarter of the sixteenth century. Throughout its existence, it was 
dismally ineffective in meeting its primary objective: securing the official brokers’ 
monopoly.  
 Unauthorised brokers appeared on the market at about the same time as official 
brokers and, in spite of a great number of attempts on the part of the Brokers’ Guild, 
they could not be eradicated. In fact, the number of unauthorised brokers only 
increased. Merchants do not seem to have cared whether their transactions were 
facilitated by an official broker or an unaccredited one. Even though deals facilitated by 
official brokers would have had a better legal status, which might have been relevant in 
case of a dispute, unofficial brokers countered this by accepting a lower fee. Brokers 
were commissioned by merchants and ship-owners on the basis of their network and 
expertise. This experience related to the intricate policy stipulations, the level of 
premium rates and the assessment of the financial solidity of underwriters. Premium 
levels would probably have been the outcome of the forces of supply and demand. At 
times, competitive forces led underwriters to offer more favourable rates than their 
competitors, leading to policies with differing premium rates. Sworn brokers were made 
responsible by the municipality for compiling and publishing updated lists of premium 
levels. The continuing battle between formal brokers and their Guild against their 
unofficial peers left its mark on the industry and the relation between parties. The 
brokers do not seem to have received much sympathy or support in their conflict with 
the unauthorised brokers. Many suspected brokers of manipulating price levels and of 
abusing their position by trading on their own account. The Guild seems to have given 
up on its continued battle against unauthorised brokers in the eighteenth century. The 
eighteenth-century records of the firm of De Vos & Zoon, unofficial brokers, confirm 
that by mid-century, these former unauthorised brokers were equal in status to official  
brokers, as evidenced by the fact that, listed among the firm’s clients were many 
prominent parties.4 
 The merchants and ship-owners, the parties turning to the Amsterdam insurance  
                                                 
3 Ibid., 55-59 
4 SAA 557, Archief De Vos inv. nr. 24. 
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market for commercial protection, were not only locals. In fact, the Amsterdam 
insurance market attracted many foreign clients and it was reputed to be the only 
market in Europe where all policies could be written, regardless of the size of the 
insurance. Moreover, Amsterdam insurers had a favourable reputation. They were said to 
pay insurance claims promptly and without hassle. Although this group of insured was 
not formally represented in any way, some of them were known to join forces when 
required to do so by the circumstances.  
 When, in 1628, a group of entrepreneurs attempted to set up a chartered 
insurance company which would force all those active on certain trade routes to pay an 
obligatory insurance fee, opposition arose. The opposition, made up of a number of 
prominent merchants and ship-owners, argued that taking out insurance was not 
common routine and that insurance premiums would in fact have reduced their already 
narrow profit margins even further. Even the advocates of the insurance company seem 
to have concurred with the statement that taking out insurance was still not common.  
Commissioning a broker, whether an official or unofficial one, probably became routine 
in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. The custom that the broker’s fee was to 
be paid by the underwriter would have promoted the commissioning of brokers. By 
stipulating a mandatory franchise, the municipal authorities aimed to promote prudence 
and decrease the risk of moral hazard. The underwriters were often the wealthiest of 
Amsterdam’s citizens. As capital started accumulating in the city, due to the expansion 
of international, and most notably Baltic, trade, these prosperous merchants sought new 
investment opportunities for their excess capital. Insurance, a financial innovation 
brought to the city by merchants who fled the problems of the Southern Netherlands, 
met this need. Insuring was long considered a sideline. Most of those acting as 
underwriter did so on occasion but invested most of their capital, financial and human, 
into their other business ventures. Even those underwriters who frequently wrote lines 
would most often be known as merchant, rather than insurer. The implication of this fact 
was that many underwriters were not fully committed to the market. If business did not 
develop profitably, they simply exited the market, concentrated their efforts on other 
ventures and invested their money elsewhere. There was another side to this dynamic, 
namely that many actors entered the market when premiums were high. These 
opportunistic underwriters were usually also the ones leaving the market at the first hint 
of problems. As they lacked tacit knowledge of, or experience with, underwriting, they 
often signed for risks more experienced insurers would not have committed to. In times 
of war or extremely bad weather, these inexperienced insurers, with their portfolio of 
‘lemons’, would have been disproportionately affected and would have bailed out. As 
with those buying insurance, there were also underwriters from outside the city walls, 
for example from villages in the vicinity of Amsterdam, like Oostzaan, De Rijp and Broek 
in Waterland. These non-locals would commission local brokers to arrange profitable 
lines for them to write. Similarly to the buyers on the market, underwriters would 
primarily have acted individually. Only when their market position or their profitability 
was endangered did they join forces to ward off the imminent danger. One collusion that 
significantly influenced the further development of the insurance industry was the one 
that was formed in 1719-1720 to prevent the establishment of an insurance company in 
the city. The opponents to this plan emphasised the danger that this company might 
soon monopolise and dominate the city’s insurance market, and it would lower premium 
rates, thereby forcing private underwriters out of the market and dictating unfavourable 
policy terms to merchants and ship-owners. The company, so they argued, would be 
detrimental to the city’s commercial position and reputation. The corps of underwriters 
of Amsterdam, once referred to as the most powerful in European trade, stood up to its 
reputation.5 The company was vetoed by the municipal authorities. This was  
                                                 
5 The observation was made by the Abbé Desnoyers, French chargé d’affaires, in a letter to Count 
Vergennes, as quoted by Spooner, Risks at sea, 25.  
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representative for the Amsterdam market, where the voices of some were more clearly 
heard in city hall than the appeals of others. It was not until 1772, long after similar 
companies had been set up in other countries and even in other cities in the Republic,  
that an initiative for an insurance company in Amsterdam was successful. By that time, 
however, things had changed: other insurance markets, in particular London, 
undermined Amsterdam’s dominance.  
 For the final case, I examined the insurance market in Rotterdam during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This city harboured the ambition to surpass its 
rival-city, Amsterdam, and challenge its dominance. Although Rotterdam followed 
Amsterdam’s lead in a number of aspects, for example concerning the issuance of an 
ordinance, the establishment of a Chamber, etc., there were also very real differences 
between the two cities. For example, in Rotterdam, moral hazard seems to have been 
less of an issue, which may have been related to the limited nature of business. Ship-
owners were still obliged to bear part of the risk themselves, but merchants were 
allowed to insure up to the full value. Also, Rotterdam municipal authorities 
acknowledged the importance of brokers far sooner than their peers in Amsterdam. 
Consequently, in Rotterdam, brokers were not regarded with suspicion or treated with 
contempt, which was in stark contrast to their position in Amsterdam. The city was 
pragmatic when it came to setting the number of brokers, thereby preventing the 
emergence of unauthorised brokers. In Rotterdam, the presence of unauthorised brokers 
never was an issue of such magnitude that it would have affected the overall 
development of the industry.  
 As Rotterdam’s merchants and ship-owners were often forced to rely upon  
the Amsterdam insurance market for commercial protection, the ambition developed  
to have a local insurance market able to meet the local needs. When two British 
entrepreneurs, who had first been turned down by the Amsterdam council, presented 
their plans for establishing an insurance company within the city, they received the 
council’s full support. An insurance company within the city walls would be beneficial to 
trade and commerce, and supporting the initiation would be for the common good. The 
fact that Rotterdam would be able to outwit Amsterdam was considered a bonus. With 
the council’s backing, the company, Maatschappij van Assurantie, Discontering en 
Beleening der Stad Rotterdam Anno 1720 (Stad Rotterdam), was set up. Regents took an 
active part in its foundation by means of private investments. The real acid test came 
soon after the bubble burst and the new company was at risk of failure. The municipal 
authorities decided they would actively support Stad Rotterdam which was able, as a 
result, to survive its troubled first years. The original objective, namely that Rotterdam’s 
merchants would no longer needed to turn to Amsterdam for insurance, was not entirely 
met. Policies written in Amsterdam would often still contain the names of insured parties 
based in Rotterdam. Also, the Rotterdam market remained subordinate to the 
Amsterdam industry. In Rotterdam, premium levels, policy conditions, fees and other 
terms were often subject to the customs, routines and levels of Amsterdam, which 
remained the dominant market. Not until the nineteenth century did Rotterdam shift its 
focus to London’s standards.  
 Nevertheless, Stad Rotterdam did influence the Rotterdam market positively. It 
often appeared on policies as lead-underwriter. Brokers would first contact the company 
and have them commit to a policy before offering the deal to other underwriters, who 
would then be more inclined to commit themselves. Thus, Stad Rotterdam did promote 
the expansion of the insurance market in the city. However, due to its size, both 
absolute and relative, it also dominated the local market, affecting the market’s 
development and how other parties to the industry related to one another. Stad 
otterdamR ’s prudence hampered progress and innovation.  
 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the Republic no longer in existence, 
Rotterdam suffered from the Continental Blockade and later the Annexation, as did 
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Amsterdam and the rest of the former Republic. Nevertheless, Stad Rotterdam managed 
to survive, and slowly recovered during the first decades of the nineteenth century. The 
Dutch economy had suffered severely from the ravages of war and occupation: the 
mercantile fleet was decimated, trade relations lost. The King of the newly proclaimed 
Kingdom, William I, set out to restore the country to its former glory. However, the world 
had changed and the nineteenth century would be a time when a number of major 
transformations accelerated. In political terms, an extra dimension was added as the 
decentralised rule of the former Republic was slowly but surely supplanted by the 
national government. The international political arena witnessed changes too, of which  
the termination of privateering as a method of war was one directly influencing the 
insurance industry. Technologically, the nineteenth century was an era of major 
innovations. Steam shipping and the use of steel and iron instead of wood not only 
changed the ship-building industry but also affected ownership structures. The 
increased capital intensity of the industry demanded different investment- and 
ownership structures. The invention of the telegraph (and later the telephone) reduced 
communication times, increased the reliability of communications and altered the 
relationship between a ship’s master and its owners. These new communication 
technologies also created new opportunities for the use of representative agents. As it 
was easier and less costly to effectively manage and monitor these agents, many 
companies, including insurance companies, set up international networks of 
representative agents. Numerous foreign insurance companies appointed agents in 
Amsterdam or Rotterdam. Many of these transformations were universal and affected 
trade and shipping and the insurance industry worldwide. However, there was a national 
dimension too. As King William I set out to rebuild the Dutch economy, one of his aims 
was to reclaim the country’s position in the profitable colonial trade, and in order to do 
so he instated the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM). The NHM was in several 
ways quite successful as it became the countries largest trading company, dominating 
colonial trade. The NHM also became the country’s largest buyer of insurance policies. 
Its statutes stipulated that it was only to use Dutch insurers and brokers. In order to 
stimulate the waning economy, the NHM paid freight tariffs and insurance premiums far 
above the going market rate. Not only were the NHM commissions highly profitable, the 
money was earned easily as the NHM set prices, determined policy regulations, assessed  
and qualified the ships, and distributed its commissions evenly over the number of 
participants. Many insurance companies were set up to benefit from these arrangements; 
their directors were often inept and inexperienced. Soon only a few brokers and 
underwriters were knowledgeable and when the fleet began to age, the NHM lowered the 
rates paid and circumstances deteriorated, with many companies failing to keep up and 
exiting the market. Although the NHM’s price setting is often regarded as its most 
detrimental influence on the market, the effect it had on the market’s structures and 
institutions may have been of greater significance. It weakened the structure of an 
industry which came under increasing international competitive pressure. A few 
prominent brokers took initiatives to increase the faltering trust in the market and 
strengthen its foundation.  It is significant that brokers from Rotterdam, who had never 
been in as unfavourable a position as their peers in Amsterdam, took the lead – later 
m.  followed by Amsterda
 
§ 3 Institutions and actors: influence and interaction  
 
What can we conclude about institutions, the way they affect the choices of the various 
actors and how they in turn are influenced by the conduct of these actors? How did the 
institutional framework of the insurance industry evolve in time and which factors 
influenced the direction of the change? How did formal institutions develop compared to 
informal institutions? In this final section, I try to explain why certain institutions 
emerged, how formal and informal institutions interacted, why some institutions 
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underwent change whereas other remained stable and in what way formal and informal 
institutions affected the behaviour of the different actors. Maritime insurance emerged 
as a result of merchants and ship-owners wishing to decrease the financial 
consequences in case their ship or goods were lost or damaged. This need for protection 
became more important as merchants no longer accompanied their merchandise on 
long-distance routes and people other than the ship-owner or ship-owners 
commandeered the ship. Although merchants could decrease their exposure by 
distributing their merchandise over several ships and ship-owners could do likewise with 
their ship investments, they would not be reimbursed in case of a loss. By transferring 
the risk to an underwriter or a mutual they would buy the certainty of reimbursement in 
case of disaster. The first stage of the process of differing risk attitude had set in. 
Information and trust were the key elements here. The primary feature of an insurance 
transaction is its intangibility. Unlike grain, textiles or wine, there is no sample to test 
the quality of the service beforehand. The initial transaction must be based on trust, i.e. 
the trust that the counterparty will not renege on his commitment.6 Greif has labelled 
this the Fundamental Problem of Exchange (FPOE). Subsequent transactions are based on 
trust, but also on experience and the tacit knowledge which the different actors develop. 
These experiences and expertise then influence choices and decisions. How could a 
merchant or ship-owner be certain that an underwriter would not renege on his promise 
to pay for the damages if the need arose? The issue was just as pressing for the 
underwriters: how could they be certain of the merchant’s or ship-owner’s good faith? 
The latter in particular were in the best possible position in terms of information. They 
generally knew most about the quality of the ship and its crew and the dangers of the 
routes and harbours. How could they enforce contractual commitment on the part of 
those buying insurance? The institutions governing the insurance industry, both formal 
and informal, had to reduce these uncertainties in order for the different actors to 
commit themselves and for a transaction to take place.  
 My research shows that, within the Netherlands, several types of institution 
emerged and governed the insurance industry. How was it possible for these differing 
systems to emerge in relative proximity to each other? A number of aspects had a 
significant influence on the emergence and development of the various institutional 
structures, such as the nature and scope of the risks involved. Which routes were sailed 
and were these considered risky, for example due to the presence of privateers or 
pirates? Were the harbours thought of as dangerous or were the waters known for their 
extreme weather or dangerous currents? The institutional framework was also affected 
by the nature of the social structure of the society, as well as by the position and actions 
of the relevant authorities. Finally the emergence of institutions was not only affected by 
the demand for insurance, but also by the potential supply of underwriting capital and 
the way these related to one another. In what way did these aspects influence the 
emergence of institutional structures governing insurance systems in Groningen, 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam?  
 In Amsterdam, insurance was introduced by foreign merchants who had 
experience with insuring as a financial instrument. Merchants with high-value 
merchandise were the first to test this novelty and they did so by observing the imported 
routines and habits. These pioneering entrepreneurs were active on a great number of 
routes, some of which were known for the danger of pirates and privateers, with ships of 
varying size and value trading a variety of commodities. The diverse nature of the 
business, the growing demand for insurance and the increasing number of actors 




                                                
ed: the industry was informally structured before any formal regulation was s
u
 In Rotterdam, the insurance market was of a different size. Not only was the  
 
6 See Greif, ‘Contract enforceability; and ‘The fundamental problem’.  
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city’s trade still limited at the time, the initial demand for insurance primarily came from 
merchants, since many vessels were owned by non-locals. Unofficial practices that 
developed based upon imported routines were sufficient to keep the restricted business 
and the various actors in check. In contrast, the nature of trade and transport in 
Groningen stimulated the initiation of mutual insurance boxes. Even though the great 
skippers of Groningen expanded their horizons and trade routes, they still kept to a 
limited set of routes and destinations. Thus, the skippers were well informed as to the 
specific dangers of the waters and harbours they sailed. The same was true of their 
ships: the skippers generally sailed the same type of ship – of which some were 
undoubtedly in better condition than others, but overall their value would not have 
differed significantly. Information regarding the risks of the trade and the assets to be 
insured was accessible, and the risks could be assessed accurately. As the great skippers  
were in need of some sort of financial safety net in case of disaster, the mutual  
insurance boxes matched their needs and could be set up within the constraints  
of the Guild.  
 The nature of the social structures of the skippers’ communities was crucial  
for the emergence of mutual insurance boxes in Groningen. The tight-knit communities 
guaranteed effective social control, keeping fraud in check. Due to the guilds’ political 
power, they, rather than the Burgomasters and city council, were effectively the ones 
setting up regulations. The dominance of the city, both politically and economically, is 
what induced the emergence of the boxes in the peat communities. The tense 
relationship between the villages and the city made the rural guilds reluctant to copy the 
box structures of their urban peers. The guilds, both in the city and in the countryside 
relied upon their social networks, the institutional framework was primarily informal. 
The boxes’ statutes were not enforced by an effective state but by private order: the 
implicit threat of ostracism was effective enough.7 
The balance between the demand for insurance and the supply of sufficient underwriting 
capital was, of the three regions, only adequately met in Amsterdam. Whereas in 
Groningen and Rotterdam, there was a certain demand for insurance, there was however 
not enough underwriting capital to meet the need. In Amsterdam, the demand for 
insurance and the supply of underwriting capital came together as capital from the 
profitable Baltic trade flowed into the city and foreign entrepreneurs introduced 
insurance as a financial instrument, enabling the expansion of the industry. The nature 
of the institutional structure and the interaction between the various parties was 
decisively affected by the social hierarchies and political allegiances in Amsterdam. 
Clearly, the heterogeneous society of the city, diversified due to immigration, wealth 
disparity and religious variations, did not lend itself for mutual insurance constructions. 
The formal regulations that were set up by the municipal authorities often did not 
concur with the routines and practices of the business. Those in power seemed to favour  
some groups of actors, and the regulations and laws they set up and issued were 
primarily intended to protect the interests of the groups of actors they favoured, not to 
create a stable and balanced institutional structure. The disparity between the formal 
and informal constraints led to an enduring tension within the industry. Within this 
setting, the Chamber of Insurance and its commissioners seem to have chosen their own 
line of action. Although there is no information on whether unsworn brokers also 
brought disputes before the Chamber, we do know that the Chamber did not honour the 
broker’s monopoly. In addition, the commissioners and secretary operated pragmatically 
and sanctioned insurance policies that did not concur with the insurance ordinance.  
 The case of Rotterdam shows the effects on the institutional framework of formal 
regulations generally concurring with the informal ones. The influence of the authorities 
in Rotterdam was very different from the situation in Amsterdam. The municipality in 
                                                 
7 See Greif for his study regarding the effectiveness of private order institutions in the late 
Medieval times in Europe, Greif, Institutions and the path, chapters 3 and 4.  
 8
Rotterdam seems to have realised that ordinances and bylaws too strict in nature would 
not be effective. The city council seems to have been quite pragmatic when regulating 
the insurance market and the profession of broking, which was so closely affiliated to 
the business. Formal constraints were aimed at enhancing the informal routines and 
habits ruling daily business. The Chamber’s mandate to force parties to honour their 
contractual obligations, as based on the insurance ordinance of the city, was in line with 
the practices of the industry. Even though the city of Rotterdam was far smaller than 
Amsterdam at the time insurances emerged, socially, the community was too 
heterogeneous in its composition to be suitable for mutual insurance boxes. It was, 
however, also too small for the distinct social hierarchies as in Amsterdam. The limited 
size of the community implied that informal constraints were often sufficient to prevent 
fraud and manipulation.  
 Clearly, general aspects such as the characteristics of the trade routes, the ships 
and merchandise, of social structures and the involvement of local authorities and of the 
relation between demand for insurance and the supply of capital all affected the three 
regions differently, and the consequences therefore differed, bringing about institutional 
variety. As we have seen, these alternative institutional structures evolved differently: 
some structures proved fairly stable through time whereas others were subject to 
constant changes. Why were some institutions more persistent than others and in what 
way did the different actors and exogenous factors influence institutional change? 
Institutions are supplanted when they are no longer self-enforcing or when 
technological innovation or organisational changes induce new transactions.8 
 In Groningen, an evolution from primarily informal constraints to formalised 
structures is discernable. This development may have been related to a changing 
attitude towards risk: from being risk-tolerant, individuals became increasingly risk-
averse. As risk-aversion increased, demand for protection and subsequently the number 
of individuals seeking protection increased. As more individuals were involved, the risk 
of disagreements and quarrels rose, necessitating more formal regulations. In addition, 
a change in trade patterns induced this development. As the skippers in Groningen 
expanded their trade routes, even by-passing their home-port when going from one 
destination to another, the social networks of the Guilds eroded. Not only did the risks 
to be covered become more complex with the greater variety in routes, destinations, 
merchandise and types of ships, but controlling the insured also became difficult as 
social control was no longer effective in the less tightly-knit communities. Guilds could 
no longer rely on informal constraints to prevent fraud, and more official regulations 
became necessary. The formal institutions for enforcing the statutes of the box were, 
however, all limited to the range of the Guilds. And as the nature of social networks 
changed, the hold of the Guilds on their members weakened.  
 Enforcement measures, in spite of their formality, were ineffective because they 
were limited to the setting of the Guilds: private order was no longer sufficient. The 
disparity between formal and informal constraints in Amsterdam continued, and the 
basis for the strained relationships between the parties was laid. The imbalance between 
routines, habits and practices on the one hand, and formal regulations on the other 
hand resulted in numerous alterations and changes to ordinances and bylaws. Clearly, 
some entrepreneurs or groups of entrepreneurs were in a far better position to induce 
change than others. The bargaining strength of the underwriters, for example, reflected 
their familial and social allegiances with the ruling class. Formal regulations were altered 
and changed over the years and often these changes favoured the merchants and ship-
owners, interchangeably active as buyers of insurance or as writers of policies. Brokers, 
who were restricted by their unfavourable reputation, were often the ones to suffer from 
the changes. The disparity did not, however, diminish as formal regulations became ever 
more strict, and a growing number of actors chose to disregard the ordinances and 
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bylaws altogether. Instead, they simply acted according to the informal constraints of 
the business. The unauthorised brokers, in particular, were known to disregard the law. 
Since the municipality had barred them from officially conducting their business, they 
would not have felt too inclined to honour ordinances which excluded them. As the 
Amsterdam insurance market expanded and specialisation set in, the continued tension 
between parties due to this institutional disparity became more of a problem. North has  
argued that with increasing specialisation, the reliability of institutions becomes all the 
more important.9 In a market with specialised parties, institutions have to resolve the 
issue of information asymmetry and decrease the risks of transacting for the less 
informed. In Amsterdam, the institutional structure did not meet this need as parts of 
the set of formal regulations were collectively ignored and the market was in some ways 
left to informal rules and practices. Further south, in Rotterdam, the city council was far 
more practical in enforcing its formal regulations than their peers in Amsterdam. For 
example, if the volume of trade necessitated more brokers, they would admit additional  
brokers, even if they would thereby exceed the officially permitted number. The tension 
between the various groups of actors, so prevalent in Amsterdam, was absent in 
Rotterdam. Brokers and underwriters realised that insufficient supply of capital and a 
growing demand for insurance implied that co-operation was a necessity if one did not 
want all insurance business to divert to Amsterdam. The foundation and management of 
the insurance company Stad Rotterdam are exemplary for Rotterdam’s institutional 
structure and the interaction between parties. From its initiation onwards, Stad 
Rotterdam was the city’s dominant underwriter, not only because of its sheer size, but 
also because of all those individuals involved in the company, as investor or as director. 
The company’s statutes and its conduct acquired a guiding role within the Rotterdam 
industry, not least because all groups of actors were represented in its management. 
Brokers, merchants and ship-owners, commissioners, regents and naturally underwriters  
were represented in Stad Rotterdam’s directie: an example of the Dutch consensus-
model avant la lettre. All parties were thus included in the development of the 
institutional framework and alignment of formal and informal structures was more easily 
attained with all parties committed. The sets of institutions remained fairly stable within 
this setting. However, the institutional structures were put to the test as major 
transformations took place during the nineteenth century. Patterns of risks altered as 
privateering lost its status of accepted method of war, but also as the result of a great 
number of technological innovations. Steam ships were costly and their equipment 
represented new, expensive, risks. On the other hand, navigational innovations and the 
invention of the telegraph reduced the risks of the trade. The increased capital intensity 
of trade and transport altered management- and ownership structures, and induced 
greater demand for insurance. The supply of underwriting capital in the Netherlands 
increased, and more insurance companies were established. However, this increase did 
not necessarily enhance the transparency of the industry: Amsterdam may have counted 
in its midst most of the corporate underwriters, but Rotterdam’s insurance companies 
had – on average – both a higher nominal and a higher paid-in capital. Demand was also 
significantly affected by the foundation of the NHM. The NHM was a direct consequence 
of the national government’s involvement in the industry and its strategy and actions 
affected the entire range of formal and informal institutions and the way they were 
related. The NHM increasingly attempted to control the market by setting premium rates 
and fees and by creating quality standards, for example by grading the underwriters 
based upon the amount of their paid-in capital. The formal constraints set by the NHM 
and governing a major part of the market became stricter. The discrepancy with the 
practices and customs of the remainder of the market increased, in particular as foreign 
competitors added an extra dimension to the already complicated world of merchants, 
underwriters, brokers and ship-owners. Since, in general, the risks increased and the 
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business became more complex, the industry and its actors were even more in need of 
reliable and effective institutions. The informal institutions of old no longer sufficed: the 
market had become international and formal regulations were now necessary to enforce 
contractual commitment. Although the Dutch government had created the overall 
regulatory framework with the Wetboek van Koophandel (Commercial code) in 1838, 
clearly this was not considered sufficient by some, such as the Rotterdam brokers. They  
felt that additional measures were necessary to reduce the uncertainties which had 
emerged within the insurance industry as a consequence of the transformations. The 
brokers of Rotterdam therefore initiated a depot of procurations to resolve some of the 
issues related to information asymmetry. Whereas some insurance companies, in 
particular from Amsterdam, opposed the brokers’ plan, the underwriters within 
Rotterdam co-operated. Again, brokers and underwriters in Rotterdam acknowledged 
that they needed to co-operate in order to stay in business and even though informal 
institutions are generally known to be tenacious, the developments in Rotterdam show 
that these too can change. The routines of the business were adjusted to international 
constraints. This research focuses on the institutions, formal and informal, governing 
the maritime insurance industry in the Netherlands and how these institutions affected 
the conduct and behaviour of the actors involved. Now that the emergence of the 
divergent institutional systems and the paths of institutional change have been 
explained, I conclude with how the different actors, merchants, underwriters, brokers, 
ship-owners and law-makers were influenced by the practices and customs, and by the 
laws and regulations. If the parties involved were content with the arrangements and 
with the institutional context governing their business, they would simply have abided 
by the constraints and conducted their business. The skippers in Groningen, for 
instance, must have been satisfied with their Guild boxes for a long time since they did 
not switch to regular insurance. However, what if individuals, or groups of individuals, 
were dissatisfied with the constraints – what were their options? One of the most 
obvious examples of the effects of institutions considered unfavourable by a certain 
group of actors is the corps of unauthorised brokers in Amsterdam, which completely 
disregarded the relevant ordinances and bylaws. Since they were officially excluded from 
their profession by these very laws, they ignored them entirely and dealt with their 
clients and the transactions in accordance with business custom. In other words: if the 
regulations were too restrictive and not in harmony with informal institutions, the 
different actors would simply by-pass the formal ones. When all actors within an 
industry were involved in developing the institutional framework, and no factions were 
excluded or shunted, the institutions were more likely to be accepted and upheld,  
and were thus more likely to be effective. The different actors might also prefer 
alternative systems. For instance, in the nineteenth century, insurance brokers preferred 
to have policies for their customers written on foreign insurance markets rather than 
conforming to the restrictions of the Dutch market, polluted as it was by the influence of 
the NHM. The risks had increased and with higher stakes, the actors – in this case the  
brokers and their clients – demanded more effective and reliable institutions in order to 
reduce uncertainty. Usually the various actors would initially have preferred to stay 
within their familiar settings and environment. The unauthorised brokers in Amsterdam, 
in spite of their constant struggle with the Brokers’ Guild, often still aspired to Guild 
membership. The skippers in Groningen often adjusted the statutes of the Guild boxes 
rather than switch to, for instance, the Amsterdam insurance market, which they in all 
probability would have heard of. In the nineteenth century, the brokers complained 
about the ineptness and complacency of Dutch underwriters, hoping to change the tides, 
before turning to the underwriters in London and Hamburg. Even so, they held on to 
familiar institutions and had the policies written under Dutch policy clauses. The 
influence of the NHM on the formal structures of the industry caused an erosion of 
expertise and knowledge among underwriters and brokers. This ultimately brought 
about a situation in which many of the actors, primarily but not exclusively the inept 
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ones, exited the industry once the easy NHM profits could no longer be earned, and the 
general state of the Dutch shipping sector deteriorated. Not all parties involved would 
have had the choice of alternatives. The skippers in Groningen may have had little choice 
initially. One could not opt for another box, since they were incorporated into their local 
Guilds. Not joining the box might have been a choice too difficult to contemplate for 
many since it might have meant they would be expelled from their social network. The 
choices of these skippers were limited to changing the structure and conditions of the 
box and as this would have involved the co-operation of a large group of fellow Guild-
members, it would not have been easy for individual Guild-members to alter the statutes 
of the box. The lack of choice and the inability of individuals to influence the conditions 
of the boxes may have led to behaviour that necessitated the changing nature of the 
statutes and the increasing number of enforcement clauses. Skippers could have found 
ways around the too restrictive regulations, for instance by stating a different value for 
their ship, or by falsely claiming damages or loss. This conduct may in turn have led to 
even stricter penalty clauses, undoubtedly an unwanted effect. Ignoring formal 
institutions, or even turning to alternative systems would not have been the first course 
of action for most actors. They would have been more likely to try and change the 
restrictions affecting their life and business. Once again, the brokers in Amsterdam 
illustrate this since they did, on numerous occasions, try to have the ordinances and 
bylaws altered in their favour. The number of requests made to the Burgomasters in 
1693 to alter the text of the oath they were to take is revealing. Others, too, attempted 
to influence the institutional structures, at times forming collusions to attain their 
objective. Underwriters in Amsterdam vetoed an insurance company and set minimum 
price levels, and brokers in Rotterdam collectively created the depot of procurations. In 
conclusion, based on this study of the maritime insurance industry in the Netherlands 
between 1600 and 1870, it is obvious that institutions, formal and informal, greatly 
affected the choices and behaviour of those involved in the insurance industry. The 
collection of routines, habits, practices, laws and regulations shaped the interaction 
between parties and thus influenced the overall development of the industry. The case 
studies of the institutional frameworks in Groningen, Amsterdam and Rotterdam show 
the persistence of informal institutions. This persistence had its impact on both the 
nature and the development of the formal institutions within the industry. The analysis 
of three institutional varieties shows that it is not so much the particulars of the formal 
constraints, but rather the balance between formal and informal constraints that 
determines the effectiveness of the institutional structure and its ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances. 
